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_______________________ 
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for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-13-cr-00592-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
______________ 
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Before: HARDIMAN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges, and 
ROSENTHAL,* District Judge. 
                                                 
 * The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States 
District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by 
designation. 
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Mark E. Coyne, Esq. 
Bruce P. Keller, Esq. [ARGUED] 
970 Broad Street 
Suite 700 
Newark, NJ  07102 
     Counsel for Appellee 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Joseph A. Ferriero appeals his judgments of 
conviction, forfeiture, and sentence based on violations of the 
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), id. § 1962(c), and the 
federal wire fraud statute, id. § 1343.  We will affirm.1 
 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
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I. 
Joseph Ferriero served as chairman of the Bergen 
County Democratic Organization (BCDO) from 1998 until he 
resigned in January 2009.  As party chair, Ferriero wielded 
significant power in the process of nominating Democrats in 
local elections and in the process of choosing which issues 
and candidates the party supported.  In his role, he raised 
money for the Democratic Party, helped elect Democratic 
candidates to local office, and managed campaigns in 
important local elections.  Significantly for this case, one 
aspect of party business was connecting and recommending 
vendors to Democrats elected or appointed to local office in 
Bergen County. 
 
Ferriero’s convictions stem from payments he took 
from a particular vendor, John Carrino, in exchange for 
recommending to certain officials that their towns hire 
Carrino’s firm.  Carrino owned C3 Holdings, LLC 
(hereinafter, “C3”)—short for Citizen Communications 
Center—a New Jersey corporation that provided emergency-
notification systems for local governments.2  Carrino also 
owned Braveside Capital, LLC, a New Jersey corporation he 
described as the “sales arm” of C3. 
Since Carrino sought municipal contracts for C3, 
Ferriero was uniquely situated to influence Democratic 
                                                 
2 Emergency-notification systems—also known as “reverse 
911” services—allow governments to use various 
communication platforms (e.g., text message, email, voice 
call) to automatically notify residents of local emergencies 
like natural disasters, missing children, loose wild animals, 
and power outages. 
4 
 
municipal officials by virtue of his position as their county 
party chair.  The two struck an agreement.  Ferriero would 
recommend C3 to local governments in exchange for a 25- to 
33-percent commission on contracts for the towns that 
ultimately hired the company.  They memorialized the 
agreement in a contract between Carrino’s Braveside Capital 
and SJC Consulting, a new company Ferriero had 
incorporated under the laws of Nevada.  The contract, 
executed April 22, 2008, describes the relationship as an 
“agreement . . . to provide governmental relations consulting 
services required in connection with marketing of a product 
known as C3 and any other related products or services.” 
 
To that end, Ferriero had drawn up a list of target 
Bergen County municipalities with corresponding names of 
Democrats in local office, and over the course of about a year, 
he “pushed hard for C3.”  Relevant to his convictions, he 
recommended C3 to local officials for the boroughs of 
Dumont, Cliffside Park, and Wood-Ridge, and for Saddle 
Brook and Teaneck townships. 
 
Ferriero made these recommendations at BCDO-
sponsored events, at local political fundraisers, at informal 
meetings, or simply over email.  For example, Ferriero made 
inroads for C3 with Dumont’s leadership at a 2007 lunch 
where he introduced Carrino to the borough’s mayor, 
Matthew McHale.  Ferriero recommended C3 to the mayor 
and followed up with an email asking, “How [are] we doing 
with C-3”?  Mayor McHale ultimately brought C3 to the 
borough administrator, who in turn took the idea to the 
borough council.  The borough council voted to license C3’s 
software.  Neither McHale, the borough administrator, nor the 
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councilmembers knew Ferriero would make money as a 
result. 
 
In August 2007, Ferriero introduced Carrino to 
Teaneck councilman El-Natan Rudolph, whose name Ferriero 
had written next to Teaneck on the list of municipal sales 
targets.  Rudolph put Carrino in touch with Teaneck’s town 
manager, Helene Fall, who that very day emailed Carrino 
about C3’s web services.  In December, the Teaneck council 
unanimously voted for a resolution, introduced by Rudolph, 
authorizing the town to pay up to $24,000 to hire C3 for the 
year 2008. 
 
In November 2007, Ferriero introduced Carrino to 
Saddle Brook Mayor Louis D’Arminio at a BCDO-sponsored 
gala.  Ferriero recommended C3’s products, and D’Arminio 
and Carrino exchanged business cards.  The town council 
ultimately voted to contract with C3 without D’Arminio or 
the township council having been aware that Ferriero stood to 
benefit financially from the contract. 
 
Sometime in 2008, Ferriero called Cliffside Park’s 
borough attorney Chris Diktas to vouch for C3 after Carrino 
pitched the service to town leaders.  Councilwoman Dana 
Spoto testified that, before the borough council voted on the 
matter, Diktas advised her that Ferriero had vouched for C3 
and that “Joe wanted it.”  The Cliffside Park council voted to 
contract with C3, resolving to authorize a $2,000-per-month 
contract, though neither Diktas nor Councilwoman Spoto 
were aware Ferriero stood to gain financially from the 
contract. 
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As Carrino’s local contracts moved forward, Ferriero 
profited as well.  Over the course of 2008, Carrino paid 
Ferriero’s SJC Consulting at least $11,875 with checks that 
included those four town names in the checks’ memo lines.  
On a check dated May 16, 2008, the memo line read “Q1/Q2 
SB / Q1 Dumont.”  A check dated July 27, 2008, had a memo 
line that read “Q1: Teaneck Q2: Teaneck, Dumont + CP – Q2 
(2m).”  And the memo line of a check dated September 18, 
2008, read “Q3: Saddlebrook & Dumont.” 
 
Sometime that same year, Cliffside Park’s mayor grew 
concerned about Ferriero’s role in the town’s contract with 
C3.  He asked the borough’s Chief Financial Officer, Frank 
Berardo, about the contract’s details and directed Berardo to 
find out “who the owners of the company were.”  On July 9, 
2008, Berardo called Carrino to inquire into the contract and 
“the owners of th[e] corporation.”  Carrino said he would 
respond by email, and roughly one hour later, emailed 
Berardo with a reply: 
 
Frank, 
Per our conversation this morning, please find 
attached copies of the State of New Jersey 
Business Certificate as well as C3’s Standard 
Software as a Service Licensing Agreement. 
Please call me if you have any questions. My 
cell is: [***.***.****] 
By way of this email I am also cc’ing [Borough 
Attorney Chris] Diktas for his review. 
Attached to the email were copies of the contract and C3’s 
certification of formation, which listed only Carrino under 
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“Members/Managers.”  There was no reference to Joseph 
Ferriero.  Cliffside Park paid Carrino for services in June and 
July with a $4,000 check dated July 9. 
 
Not all of the localities on Ferriero’s list ultimately 
hired C3.  The Borough of Wood-Ridge declined to contract 
with C3, but the borough’s mayor Paul Sarlo still felt 
pressured to do so.  Mayor Sarlo broke the news of Wood-
Ridge’s decision to Ferriero and Carrino at a local political 
fundraiser.  Ferriero and Carrino were upset and the ensuing 
conversation “got tense and . . . heated” until a Sarlo staffer 
intervened. 
 
Ferriero pushed Democratic officials from Bergen 
County towns to contract with C3, and four of the localities 
on his list eventually did so.  He was paid thousands of 
dollars based on those four contracts in checks listing out 
which payments corresponded to which town.  But none of 
the local Democratic officials to whom Ferriero 
recommended C3 were aware he stood to profit. 
 
II. 
A federal grand jury returned a five-count Indictment 
that charged Ferriero with violations of RICO, the Travel Act, 
and federal mail and wire fraud statutes.  Count 1 charged 
Ferriero with violating RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), alleging 
he conducted the Bergen County Democratic Organization 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.  As proof of that 
pattern, the Indictment alleged seven predicate racketeering 
acts.  Racketeering acts #1 and #2 were based on allegations 
of bribery, extortion, and honest services fraud unrelated to 
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Ferriero’s contract with C3.3  Predicate racketeering acts #3 
through #7 alleged the payments made in exchange for 
Ferriero’s recommendations to local Democratic officials in 
favor of contracting with C3 violated New Jersey’s bribery 
statute.  That provision prohibits “accept[ing] or agree[ing] to 
accept . . . [a]ny benefit as consideration for a decision, 
opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a 
public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in 
any public election.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Count 2 charged Ferriero with conspiracy to commit 
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, wire fraud, id. § 1343, and 
violations of the Travel Act, id. § 1952.  Count 3 charged a 
substantive Travel Act violation based on an underlying 
violation of New Jersey’s bribery statute.  Counts 4 and 5 
charged violations of mail and wire fraud, respectively, 
alleging Carrino and Ferriero defrauded Dumont (Count 4) 
and Cliffside Park (Count 5).  Count 5’s underlying fraud 
allegation stemmed from the Carrino email to Cliffside Park 
                                                 
3 The jury found the government failed to prove racketeering 
acts #1 and #2.  Racketeering act #1 alleged Ferriero 
orchestrated the appointment of Dennis Oury as Bergenfield, 
NJ, borough attorney.  Ferriero allegedly committed bribery 
and honest services fraud when he gave Oury a financial 
interest in a Ferriero-owned grant-writing company called 
GGC in exchange for Oury’s promise to arrange for 
Bergenfield to hire the firm.  Racketeering act #2 alleged 
Ferriero committed bribery and extortion when he and others 
accepted a $35,000-per-month consulting fee in exchange for 
supporting a commercial development project in the Bergen 
County town of East Rutherford. 
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that failed to disclose Ferriero’s financial interest in the 
borough’s contract with C3. 
 
Before trial, Ferriero moved to dismiss Count 1 
(RICO) on the ground the Indictment failed to allege RICO’s 
so-called “nexus” requirement, and moved to dismiss Counts 
1–3, arguing New Jersey’s bribery statute was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  Both motions were 
denied. 
 
The jury found Ferriero guilty on Count 1 (RICO), 
Count 3 (Travel Act), and Count 5 (wire fraud).  As noted, the 
jury determined that, for Count 1’s seven alleged racketeering 
acts, the government did not prove Ferriero committed 
racketeering acts #1 and #2, the alleged crimes unrelated to 
the C3 scheme.  See supra, note 3.  But the jury concluded 
Ferriero committed racketeering acts #3 through #7—that is, 
the jury concluded Ferriero committed bribery by agreeing to 
recommend C3’s services in exchange for a share of any 
resulting contracts’ revenues.  The jury acquitted Ferriero of 
Count 2 (conspiracy) and Count 4 (mail fraud). 
 
Ferriero had moved for judgment of acquittal on all 
counts following the close of the government’s case at trial, 
and he renewed that motion for Counts 1, 3, and 5, which the 
court denied.  Ferriero was sentenced to three concurrent 35-
month prison terms and ordered to forfeit the money 
equivalent of the proceeds he derived from the racketeering 
and wire fraud.  Ferriero appealed. 
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III. 
A. 
Ferriero mounts three challenges on the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting his convictions for violating RICO 
and the Travel Act.4 
 
1. 
Ferriero asserts the evidence was insufficient to prove 
New Jersey bribery as a predicate act for his Travel Act and 
RICO convictions. 
 
The Travel Act prohibits using interstate travel, mail, 
or facilities with intent to carry out “any unlawful activity,” 
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), or with intent to “distribute the 
proceeds of any unlawful activity,” id. § 1952(a)(1).  The 
definition of “unlawful activity,” includes “bribery . . . in 
violation of the laws of the State in which committed.”  Id. 
§ 1952(b)(2).  RICO proscribes participating in the conduct of 
an interstate enterprise’s affairs “through a pattern of 
racketeering activity,” id. § 1962(c), a term defined to include 
                                                 
4 For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
construe the evidence in favor of the government and reverse 
only if no rational juror could have found all essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Boria, 
592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010).  To the extent Ferriero’s 
sufficiency arguments raise issues of statutory interpretation, 
our review is plenary.  United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 
794 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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acts involving “bribery . . . which is chargeable under State 
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” 
id. § 1961(1)(A). 
Ferriero’s Travel Act and RICO convictions both rest 
on the jury’s determination that, as a party official, he 
violated New Jersey’s prohibition against “[b]ribery in 
official and political matters.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2.  
According to that provision, “[a] person is guilty of bribery if 
he directly or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer 
upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept . . . [a]ny 
benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public 
servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any 
public election.”  Id. 
 
The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s conclusion Ferriero violated New Jersey’s bribery 
statute.  He agreed to accept payments from John Carrino as 
consideration for a particular recommendation on a public 
issue—namely, his favorable recommendation to Democrats 
holding office in Bergen County on the public issue of 
whether their towns should contract to hire C3. 
 
Ferriero asserts his conviction requires additional 
proof he agreed to “undermine the integrity of the towns’ 
processes in considering whether to purchase the C3 
product.”  Appellant Br. at 29.  For this proposition he cites 
United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), a 
Travel Act case in which the alleged predicate “unlawful 
activity” was a violation of New Jersey’s predecessor bribery 
statute that has since been repealed and superseded.  Dansker 
held that a conviction under New Jersey’s predecessor bribery 
statute required proof a defendant agreed to “undermine the 
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integrity of [a] public action.” Id. at 49.  Ferriero relies on 
Dansker to maintain the government must show an integrity-
undermining intent to prove he violated New Jersey’s current 
bribery statute. 
 
Dansker involved several alleged bribes paid by real 
estate developers to the vice-chair of the Fort Lee, New 
Jersey parking authority.  Id. at 44.  The developers owned a 
large swath of property at the western terminus of the George 
Washington Bridge—property zoned for non-commercial 
use—and sought zoning variances in order to develop the 
property into a shopping center.  Id.  Nathan Serota, a nearby 
resident and the local parking authority’s vice-chair, launched 
a public campaign against it, though he never acted in his 
capacity as a public official.  Id. at 44–45.  The developers 
paid Serota to drop the public campaign, which a jury 
concluded violated the Travel Act because the payments 
amounted to bribes in violation of New Jersey’s then-existing 
bribery statute.  Id. at 44.  That statute included broad 
language prohibiting anyone—public officials or otherwise—
from giving or accepting “any . . . thing of value . . . to 
procure any work, service, license, permission, approval or 
disapproval, or any other act or thing connected with or 
appertaining to any [governmental body].”5  Id. at 48 
(alteration in original). 
                                                 
5 In full, the predecessor bribery statute at issue in Dansker 
read: 
Any person who directly or indirectly gives or 
receives, offers to give or receive, or promises 
to give or receive any money, real estate, 
service or thing of value as a bribe, present or 
reward to obtain, secure or procure any work, 
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We observed that the statute did not require a bribe 
recipient occupy a position of public trust, nor did it require a 
recipient “attempt to influence governmental action in an 
unlawful or otherwise corrupt manner.”  Id.  Read literally, 
the statute’s breadth risked running afoul of the First 
Amendment, and we construed the provision to reach “only 
that conduct which has been the traditional concern of the law 
of bribery—conduct which is intended, at least by the alleged 
briber, as an assault on the integrity of a public office or an 
official action.”  Id.  We explained the gravamen of the 
offense was the recipient “agree[ing] to utilize whatever 
apparent influence he might possess to somehow corrupt a 
public office or an official act.”  Id.  We did not read the 
statute as criminalizing public officials influencing 
governmental action in otherwise legal ways.  Id. at 49.  
Rather, we said that to prove a violation of the statute as a 
federal predicate, the government must demonstrate: 
 
(a) that the alleged recipient, whether he be a 
public official or not, possessed at least the 
apparent ability to influence the particular 
public action involved; and (b) that he agreed to 
                                                                                                             
service, license, permission, approval or 
disapproval, or any other act or thing connected 
with or appertaining to any office or department 
of the government of the state or of any county, 
municipality or other political subdivision 
thereof, or of any public authority, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:93–6 (repealed 1978); Dansker, 537 F.2d 
at 48. 
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exert that influence in a manner which would 
undermine the integrity of that public action. 
Id.  Because Serota, in his capacity as parking vice-chair, had 
no actual or apparent ability to influence the official decisions 
concerning the shopping center development, there was no 
evidence that, in purchasing his support, the developers 
corrupted the zoning board’s decisionmaking process.  Id. at 
50. 
 
Several years later, New Jersey repealed the statute at 
issue in Dansker.  As part of the state’s comprehensive 
reform of its criminal code, the legislature repealed the 
predecessor bribery statute and enacted the current version, 
see Act of Aug. 29, 1979, ch. 178, 1979 N.J. Laws 664, 712–
13 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2), which is more 
narrow than the statute we construed in Dansker.  The 
predecessor statute applied to the universe of persons in New 
Jersey, whereas the current statute’s language is limited to 
bribing persons in positions of public trust—that is, “a public 
servant, party official or voter,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2—
and the current provision only prohibits bribing those persons 
to secure a particular decision, opinion, recommendation, or 
vote, see id. 
 
Ferriero suggests we read into New Jersey’s current 
bribery provision Dansker’s language requiring an agreement 
to undermine the integrity of a public action.  But he does not 
cite any cases in our court or New Jersey’s courts reading that 
requirement into the current provision.  Ferriero cites several 
cases that borrow Dansker’s language, Appellant Br. at 22–
23, but those cases do not involve the substantive application 
of New Jersey bribery law.  Rather, they employ Dansker’s 
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language to describe bribery generically.  See United States v. 
Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 n.23 (3d Cir. 1977). 
The importance of generic descriptions of crimes like 
bribery stems from federal enforcement schemes that 
incorporate state law.  When a federal scheme incorporates 
state law, whether a state-law violation qualifies as a federal 
predicate depends on whether the state offense falls within 
that crime’s generic definition.6  Id. at 1137.  In United States 
v. Forsythe, for example, we considered whether 
Pennsylvania’s bribery statute qualified as a predicate for 
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), which incorporates “act[s] . . 
. involving . . . bribery.”  Id. (alteration in original).  Citing 
Dansker, we noted “[t]he generic description of bribery is 
‘conduct which is intended, at least by the alleged briber, as 
an assault on the integrity of a public office or an official 
action.’”  Id. at 1137 n.23 (quoting Dansker, 537 F.2d at 48).7 
 
                                                 
6 In United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 287 (1968), for 
example, the Supreme Court considered whether 
Pennsylvania’s law punishing “blackmail” could be used as a 
predicate for the Travel Act, which incorporates “‘extortion’ 
in violation of the laws of the State in which committed.”  
The Supreme Court explained that even though Pennsylvania 
did not explicitly call the offense “extortion,” it was still a 
valid Travel Act predicate because the conduct punishable as 
“blackmail” fell within extortion’s generic definition.  Id. at 
296. 
7 We quoted the same language in later cases evaluating 
whether state bribery laws counted as federal predicates.  See 
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 362 (3d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 387 n.21 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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But there is sa difference between the elements of 
underlying state-law predicates and the definition of generic 
offenses enumerated in federal laws like RICO and the Travel 
Act.  Dansker involved construing New Jersey’s predecessor 
bribery statute for purposes of its substantive application, 
whereas Forsythe and subsequent cases merely borrowed 
Dansker’s language to define bribery in generic terms.  
Ferriero does not argue that New Jersey’s current bribery 
statute falls outside the generic definition of bribery.  Rather, 
he suggests we take the requirement the Dansker court read 
into the predecessor statute—that the government prove an 
agreement to undermine the integrity of a public action—and 
likewise read that requirement into the current provision as an 
additional, extra-textual element. 
 
We decline to do so.  We read the current statute as 
sufficiently distinguishable from the statute in Dansker that 
we need not extend Dansker’s limiting construction of the 
predecessor statute to the current one.  For that reason, we see 
no basis for disturbing Ferriero’s Travel Act and RICO 
convictions on sufficiency grounds. 
 
2. 
Next, Ferriero challenges his RICO conviction by 
attacking the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c)’s “nexus” element.  Section 1962(c) makes it 
unlawful “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity.”  Id.  The nexus element requires 
proving a sufficiently close relationship between the 
defendant, his involvement in the enterprise’s affairs, and the 
pattern of racketeering.  See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
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Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 371 (3d Cir. 2010).  This includes the 
relationship between the defendant and the conduct of the 
enterprise’s affairs, see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 
170, 179 (1993), and between those affairs and the predicate 
racketeering activity, see Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 371; see 
also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331–33 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (discussing the relational permutations of the 
defendant, enterprise, and racketeering acts in § 1962(c)’s 
nexus element).  The latter relationship, which Ferriero 
asserts was not proved here, proceeds from the requirement a 
defendant participate in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs 
“through” racketeering.  In In re Insurance Brokerage 
Antitrust Litigation, we said that relationship exists if a 
defendant “participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s 
affairs . . . through—that is ‘by means of, by consequence of, 
by reason of, by the agency of, or by the instrumentality of’—
a pattern of racketeering activity.” 618 F.3d at 372 (quoting 
United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 53 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 
Here, the District Court properly instructed the jury 
that “the government must demonstrate that Joseph Ferriero 
conducted or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the 
enterprise by means of, by consequence of, by reason of, by 
agency of, or by the instrumentality of a pattern of 
racketeering activity.”  The relevant “enterprise” was the 
Bergen County Democratic Organization.  Its “affairs” 
include any matters and concerns that constituted party 
business.8  And the jury concluded the C3 scheme amounted 
                                                 
8 See 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 35 
(1961) (defining “affairs” as “commercial, professional, or 
public business”); Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (4th ed. 1968) 
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to a pattern of bribery.  Therefore, the question is whether a 
rational juror could conclude the C3 bribery scheme was one 
means by which Ferriero participated in the conduct of party 
business. 
 
The record contains more than enough evidence for a 
rational juror to conclude that it was.  A rational juror could 
conclude it was party business when Ferriero recommended 
vendors to party members holding local office.  As the 
District Court observed, multiple witnesses testified Ferriero 
regularly recommended vendors to local Democratic 
officials.9  In fact, the BCDO hosted an annual gala at the 
municipal convention where local officials came to find 
vendors and providers of professional services.  And, as party 
chair, Ferriero’s recommendations carried great weight.  A 
rational juror could conclude that when Ferriero made certain 
recommendations to local Democratic officials (regarding 
vendors or otherwise), it was party business by virtue of the 
considerable influence he held over those officials’ reelection 
                                                                                                             
(defining “affairs” as “[a]n inclusive term, bringing within its 
scope and meaning anything that a person may do”).   
9 For example, Mayor Sarlo (Wood-Ridge) testified Ferriero 
regularly advised him about vendors.  Mayor McHale 
(Dumont) testified Ferriero would advise him on hiring 
professional service providers and make particular 
recommendations when the town had particular needs.  
Ferriero recommended C3 to Mayor D’Arminio (Saddle 
Brook) at the same municipal conference where, several years 
earlier, Ferriero had recommended the engineering company 
Saddle Brook hired when D’Arminio first assumed the office 
of mayor. 
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and career prospects.  Indeed, Ferriero’s list of target officials 
and towns in Bergen County was almost entirely composed of 
Democratic officials and towns controlled by Democrats.  A 
rational juror could conclude Ferriero conducted party 
business and the C3 bribery scheme in tandem when he 
carried out the scheme by recommending C3 to local 
Democratic officials and using his influence to urge that they 
award C3 contracts.  A rational juror could therefore conclude 
the pattern of bribery was one means by which Ferriero 
participated in the conduct of the BCDO’s affairs. 
 
Ferriero asserts a rational juror could not reach that 
conclusion, and offers two arguments.  We find neither 
persuasive.  First, he argues the evidence was insufficient 
because it did not show he recommended C3 while 
performing an official BCDO duty or while acting in his 
capacity as party chairman.  But a rational juror could have 
found that the BCDO’s affairs went beyond the chair’s 
official duties.  As noted, the BCDO’s affairs included those 
matters and concerns that comprised party business, and a 
rational juror could have concluded that party business 
included recommendations to party members in local office, 
in particular recommendations about hiring vendors.  Ferriero 
need not have carried out the bribery scheme in an official 
capacity for a rational juror to conclude it was a means by 
which he participated in the conduct of the party’s affairs. 
 
Ferriero also argues that participating in the conduct of 
an enterprise’s affairs by means of racketeering categorically 
excludes cases in which a defendant’s association with the 
enterprise facilitates his predicate acts.  Ferriero affirmatively 
agreed to the nexus instruction charged to the jury and takes 
20 
 
no issue with it on appeal.10  He nonetheless asserts that, 
because there was evidence he used his BCDO position to 
facilitate his bribery scheme, the record lacks evidence that 
bribery was a means by which he participated in the conduct 
of the BCDO’s affairs.  As noted, there was more than 
enough evidence for a rational juror to conclude bribery was a 
means by which Ferriero participated in the conduct of the 
BCDO’s affairs.  And in any event, his understanding of the 
nexus element is incorrect. 
 
                                                 
10 The government suggests Ferriero’s nexus argument 
necessarily embeds a jury-instruction challenge into a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack, and urges us to reject his 
argument as invited error or alternatively to review it for plain 
error, because Ferriero’s attorney played an affirmative role 
in formulating the instruction.  Appellee Br. at 33.  If a 
defendant specifically requested an instruction, then he 
invited any alleged error in it and waived the right to argue it 
was flawed on appeal.  See United States v. Andrews, 681 
F.3d 509, 517 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012).  But if he acquiesced to an 
instruction, then he forfeited (rather than waived) the 
argument and we may correct the error if it was “plain error . . 
. affecting substantial rights.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see 
United States v. Lawrence, 662 F.3d 551, 557 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (reviewing for plain error where a defendant 
“acquiesced [to a jury instruction] . . . but he did not invite it” 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (distinguishing 
waiver from forfeiture).  Assuming plain error review is 
appropriate, there was no error in the instruction, much less 
plain error, because Ferriero’s nexus interpretation is 
incorrect. 
21 
 
Ferriero’s flawed understanding stems from his 
misreading of a footnote in Insurance Brokerage that said it 
would “invert[] the relationship specified by § 1962(c),” 618 
F.3d at 372 n.69, for the nexus inquiry to ask whether “the 
defendant was able to commit the predicate acts by means of . 
. . his association with the enterprise,” id. (quoting Brandao, 
539 F.3d at 53).  Ferriero mistakenly reads our explanation to 
mean that in those circumstances—that is, when a defendant 
is able to commit racketeering by means of his association 
with an enterprise—it can never satisfy the required 
relationship between racketeering and the enterprise’s affairs. 
 
That reading puts more weight on the word “invert” 
than it can bear, and it ignores Insurance Brokerage’s 
relevant holding.  The Insurance Brokerage test asks whether 
racketeering was a means of conducting the enterprise’s 
affairs, but it does not foreclose satisfying the nexus when a 
defendant’s position also enabled or facilitated the 
racketeering.  In fact, those two situations may well overlap.  
For example, a crime boss can “[be] able to commit [murder] 
by means of . . . his association with [his crime syndicate],” 
see Brandao, 539 F.3d at 53, and simultaneously 
“participate[] in the conduct of [his crime syndicate’s] affairs 
. . . by means of . . . a pattern of [murder],” see Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 372.  We did not, in a footnote, 
transform § 1962(c)’s application by ruling out an entire 
category of cases that otherwise fall comfortably within the 
statute.  The statute examines the relationship between the 
racketeering and the enterprise’s affairs.  But the relationship 
between the racketeering and the defendant’s association with 
the enterprise may be relevant—and indeed sufficient—to 
satisfy the required relationship between the racketeering and 
the enterprise’s affairs. 
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That much is clear from Insurance Brokerage’s 
relevant holding.  There, in a case that evaluated a civil RICO 
complaint at the pleading stage,11 we concluded that 
§ 1962(c)’s nexus was not satisfied by allegations defendants 
simply used an opportunity provided by a legitimate 
enterprise—there, an industry group—to plot, discuss, or 
otherwise facilitate predicate acts.  Id. at 380–81.  But we said 
that if defendants “actually utilized [the industry group’s] 
institutional machinery to formulate strategy and issue public 
statements in aid of their [alleged racketeering acts],” id. at 
381, it would plausibly imply the pattern of racketeering was 
“one way they operated the enterprise,” id. at 381–82.  The 
allegations we determined could satisfy pleading plaintiffs’ 
nexus element contradict Ferriero’s nexus interpretation. 
 
Ferriero’s interpretation would also contradict familiar 
RICO examples and prior Third Circuit cases in which a 
public official’s position facilitated predicate racketeering 
acts.12  Ferriero’s reading would likewise run counter to the 
                                                 
11 Insurance Brokerage involved civil RICO claims, and 
though the burden of proof differs in civil and criminal RICO 
actions, the requisite nexus showing does not.  See United 
States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 796 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1998). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 362 
(1980) (state senator’s office); United States v. McDade, 28 
F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 1994) (U.S. Congressman’s office, 
office employees, and committee staff); United States v. 
Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 855–56 (3d Cir. 1990) (City Council of 
Pittsburgh); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 450 (3d 
Cir.1979) (Philadelphia Traffic Court); United States v. 
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Supreme Court’s explanation that “RICO . . . protects the 
public from those who would unlawfully use an ‘enterprise’ 
(whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a ‘vehicle’ through 
which ‘unlawful . . . activity is committed.’”  Cedric Kushner 
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 164 (2001) (quoting 
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 
(1994)) (second alteration in original).  Several other circuit 
opinions apply standards that satisfy § 1962(c)’s nexus if the 
enterprise facilitates racketeering.13  And Ferriero’s reading 
                                                                                                             
Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089–90 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 691 (2017) (“[P]redicate 
acts must be . . . related to the enterprise . . . [such] that the 
defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely because 
of his position in the enterprise or his involvement in or 
control over the enterprise’s affairs, or because the offense 
related to the activities of the enterprise.” (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 
800 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 908 
(2016) (“It suffices that the defendant was able to commit the 
predicate acts by means of, by consequence of, by reason of, 
by the agency of, or by the instrumentality of his association 
with the enterprise.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533–34 (5th Cir. 
1992) (“[The] nexus is established by proof that the defendant 
has in fact committed the racketeering acts alleged, that the 
defendant’s association with the enterprise facilitated the 
commission of the acts, and that the acts had some effect on 
the enterprise.”); United States v. Pieper, 854 F.2d 1020, 
1026 (7th Cir. 1988) (“To establish the nexus required by 
§ 1962(c) between the racketeering activity and the affairs of 
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makes little sense given precedent elsewhere that predicate 
acts need not benefit the enterprise.14 
 
We reiterate Insurance Brokerage’s statement that 
racketeering must be one means by which the defendant 
participates in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs.  As 
noted, we believe there was sufficient evidence for a rational 
juror to conclude Ferriero participated in the conduct of the 
BCDO’s affairs by means of a pattern of bribery.  We will 
affirm Ferriero’s RICO conviction on grounds that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction’s nexus 
element. 
 
3. 
Ferriero’s final sufficiency challenge contests his wire 
fraud conviction.  A person violates the federal wire fraud 
statute by using interstate wires to execute “any scheme or 
                                                                                                             
the enterprise, . . . the government must show that: (1) the 
defendant committed the racketeering acts, (2) the defendant's 
position in or relation with the enterprise facilitated 
commission of the acts, and (3) the acts had ‘some effect’ on 
the enterprise.”); see also United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 
426, 439–40 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating it satisfied the nexus 
element when a judge “physically used his judicial office . . . 
[and] the prestige and power of the office itself” to commit 
racketeering). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1320–21 
(11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 84 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Grubb, 11 F.3d at 439; United States v. Welch, 
656 F.2d 1039, 1061–62 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). 
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artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises.”  18 U.S.C. § 1343.  The jury found Ferriero guilty 
of wire fraud based on Carrino’s July 9, 2008, email to 
Cliffside Park CFO Frank Berardo.  The jury concluded that 
Carrino’s email to Berardo “intentionally fail[ed] to disclose 
Joseph Ferriero’s financial interest in C3’s contract with the 
borough of Cliffside Park.”  The jury concluded Carrino’s 
email amounted to executing “a scheme or artifice to defraud 
the borough of Cliffside Park and to obtain money from the 
borough of Cliffside Park by means of materially false and 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.”  Id.  The 
issue then is whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational 
juror to conclude Carrino’s failure to disclose Ferriero’s C3 
interest amounted to a materially false or fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
 
Assessing whether a communication is fraudulent, 
truthful, or otherwise is a highly contextual inquiry.  See 
United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(observing that in the inquiry into “whether [a scheme] [i]s 
fraudulent in nature, there are no hard and fast rules of law to 
apply”); see also Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex 
rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (2016) (concluding 
disputed claims, though technically true, “were clearly 
misleading in context”).  Express falsehoods lie at fraud’s 
core, but a fraudulent representation “need not be fraudulent 
on its face,” Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535, nor must it 
necessarily “involve affirmative misrepresentation,” Kehr 
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Rather, a fraudulent or false representation “may be 
effected by deceitful statements of half-truths or the 
concealment of material facts.”  United States v. Bryant, 655 
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F.3d 232, 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
In Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar, the Supreme Court discussed the gray area “half-
truths” occupy in the context of fraud.  See 136 S. Ct. at 2000.  
In Escobar, the defendant health care provider submitted 
Medicaid reimbursement claims without disclosing that the 
underlying care did not comply with relevant regulations.  Id. 
at 1997–98.  The issue was whether the submissions 
amounted to “false or fraudulent claims” within the meaning 
of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).  Id. at 
1995–96.  The government invoked the common-law rule 
“that, while nondisclosure alone ordinarily is not actionable, 
‘[a] representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which 
the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading 
because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter’ 
is actionable.”  Id. at 1999 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 529 (1976)).  Defendant Universal Health invoked a 
different common-law maxim, similar to Ferriero’s 
contention here: “nondisclosure of legal violations is not 
actionable absent a special ‘duty . . . to exercise reasonable 
care to disclose the matter in question.’”  Id. at 2000 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1)) (alteration in 
original). 
 
The Court resolved the claims “[fell] squarely within 
the rule that half-truths—representations that state the truth 
only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying 
information—can be actionable misrepresentations.”15  Id. 
                                                 
15 By way of illustration, the Escobar Court gave several 
examples of half-truths actionable as misrepresentations.  136 
S.Ct. at 2000.  A “classic example” from contract law is “the 
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(footnote omitted).  The claims were “clearly misleading in 
context,” because anyone reading them “would probably—
but wrongly—conclude the clinic had complied with” the 
underlying regulations.  Id. 
 
Here, Ferriero asserts the evidence was insufficient to 
prove wire fraud because Berardo asked only who owned the 
corporation, and no more.  Ferriero contends the failure to 
disclose his involvement was a mere omission, which does 
not constitute a false representation unless a party has a duty 
of disclosure based on “a fiduciary or similar special 
relationship.”  Appellant Br. at 39. 
 
Ferriero primarily relies on our opinion in Kehr 
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, which involved a civil RICO 
claim for which the predicate acts were alleged mail fraud.  
926 F.2d at 1408.  In a leveraged buyout, the purchasers 
alleged bankers from the deal’s financier, Fidelity Bank, 
promised a credit line the bankers never actually intended to 
secure.  Id. at 1410.  When Kehr ultimately fell short on 
working capital, those bankers had left Fidelity.  Id.  The loan 
had been transferred to Thomas Donnelly, a vice-president 
who Kehr believed had authority to secure the credit line, but 
                                                                                                             
seller who reveals that there may be two new roads near a 
property he is selling, but fails to disclose that a third 
potential road might bisect the property.”  Id. (citing Junius 
Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931) 
(Cardozo, J.)).  Another example would be a job applicant at 
a local college listing “retirement” after previous jobs, 
without disclosing “retirement” was a prison stint for bank 
fraud.  Id. (citing 3 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts 
§ 682, pp. 702–03 & n. 14 (2d ed. 2011)). 
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who was actually in charge of protecting Fidelity’s interest in 
the collateral for the initial loan.  Id.  Kehr’s management 
repeatedly asked Donnelly about the line of credit, to which 
he responded that he would review the matter and that Kehr 
should draft a “plan of attack” demonstrating how its 
financial situation could be improved.  Id.  Kehr eventually 
ran out of working capital, at which point Donnelly revealed 
he was actually with the asset-recovery group, mailed Kehr a 
notice of default, and confessed judgment against the loan 
collateral.  Id. at 1410–11.  The relevant issue was whether 
Donnelly’s alleged actions amounted to fraud.  Id. at 1416. 
 
Relevant here, the Kehr plaintiffs alleged Donnelly 
committed fraud when he failed to disclose he worked in 
Fidelity’s asset-recovery group and lacked lending authority.  
Id.  We concluded that “none of Donnelly’s alleged acts or 
omissions could be ‘reasonably calculated to deceive a person 
of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’”  Id. (quoting 
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535).  The non-disclosure of 
Donnelly’s job title, without more, could not amount to fraud.  
Id.  Donnelly never actually represented that he had lending 
authority or that he would secure the funds.  Id.  His non-
disclosure could not “reasonably be said to be deceptive” and 
there was therefore “no deceit []or fraud within the meaning 
of the mail fraud statute.”  Id. 
 
Ferriero likens himself and Carrino to Donnelly, and 
contends the non-disclosure of Ferriero’s C3 interest cannot 
amount to deceit or fraud absent a “fiduciary-like duty to the 
representatives or the people of Cliffside Park.”  Appellant 
Br. at 39.  Some cases have required a fiduciary or other duty 
to impose liability for non-disclosure, but those cases have 
generally involved contexts where defendants made no actual 
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representation and instead faced potential liability for simply 
staying silent.16   Here, there was an actual representation—
Carrino’s email of July 9, 2008—and the issue is whether 
there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude 
the representation, in context, was materially false and 
fraudulent. 
 
We conclude there was.  The evidence showed 
Cliffside Park’s leadership had concerns about the C3 
contract and “who was involved with C3 Communications.”  
The morning of July 9, 2008, Cliffside Park CFO Frank 
Berardo called Carrino to “find out, number one, where is the 
                                                 
16 For example, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980), a securities fraud case, the Supreme Court confronted 
the “legal effect of [a defendant’s] silence,” id. at 226, 
relating to a stock transaction in which the defendant had 
deduced the existence of a corporate takeover by virtue of his 
work at the financial printer that drew up takeover-bid 
announcements, id. at 224.  “[S]ilence in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities may operate as fraud . . . [if 
there exists] a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of 
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”  Id. at 
230.  Corporate insiders have a fiduciary obligation to 
shareholders, and even “tippees” of inside information have 
an obligation to disclose arising from their participation in the 
insider’s fiduciary breach.  Id. at 230 & n.12.  But the print 
employee—who was “a complete stranger”—lacked any role 
as agent, fiduciary, or occupant of a position of company trust 
or confidence.  Id. at 232–33.  Therefore, his nondisclosure of 
information—that is, his “silence” during the securities 
transaction—could not be the basis of fraud liability.  Id. at 
235. 
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contract, and who are the owners of this corporation.”  Even 
though Carrino was the corporation’s sole owner, he did not 
answer Berardo’s questions, and replied he would answer 
with an email instead.  When he sent that email, the attached 
C3 certificate of formation listed John Carrino as the 
corporation’s only member or managing member.  A rational 
juror could have concluded that the email, in context, held out 
to Cliffside Park officials that Carrino was the only individual 
who stood to profit from Cliffside Park’s C3 contract.  A 
rational juror could have concluded the email, while true “so 
far as it goes[,]   . . . omitt[ed] critical qualifying 
information”—namely, information that Ferriero was entitled 
to 25 percent of C3’s Cliffside Park profits.  See Escobar, 136 
S. Ct. at 2000. 
 
Whether a representation is false or fraudulent is a 
contextual inquiry, see Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 535, that a jury 
is particularly well-suited to assess.  Here, the jury heard 
testimony from the parties involved and concluded the 
omission in Carrino’s email amounted to a materially false 
and fraudulent pretense or representation.  We cannot say 
there was insufficient evidence for a rational juror to reach 
that conclusion. 
 
B. 
In his second set of challenges, Ferriero levels several 
attacks—statutory and constitutional—against the validity of 
his convictions based on violations of New Jersey’s bribery 
statute. 
 
1. 
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Ferriero’s first challenge posits Congress did not 
intend political party officials to fall in the category of 
individuals punishable for bribery as a RICO or Travel Act 
predicate.17 
 
On this point, Ferriero relies primarily on Perrin v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).  There, the Supreme Court 
held the language “bribery . . . in violation of the laws of the 
State in which committed” that appears in the Travel Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1952, includes commercial bribery laws and not just 
common-law bribery limited to public officials, Perrin, 444 
U.S. at 50.  The Perrin petitioners were charged with 
violating the Travel Act by using interstate facilities to 
promote a commercial bribery scheme proscribed by 
Louisiana law.  Id. at 38–39.  They maintained the Travel 
Act’s use of “bribery” was confined to the common-law 
                                                 
17 Ferriero did not raise this issue before the District Court.  
On appeal, Ferriero concedes the issue faces plain-error 
review.  The government states the issue at least faces plain-
error review, but also suggests Ferriero waived the argument 
based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, which 
addresses claims the indictment fails to state an offense.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v), (c)(3).  We have not decided 
the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(3) claims raised for the 
first time on appeal, but courts of appeal that have applied the 
rule have employed plain-error review.  See United States v. 
Soto, 794 F.3d 635, 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2015).  Because 
the parties did not brief the issue and because Ferriero’s 
argument fails under any standard we might apply, we need 
not address the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(3) claims 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
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definition punishing only bribery of public officials, and 
asserted their conduct was therefore not chargeable as a 
federal offense.  Id. at 41. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected that argument and instead 
concluded Congress intended a broader understanding of 
bribery, which by 1961—the year of the Travel Act’s 
passage—extended beyond the crime’s common-law 
definition.  Id. at 45.  The Court observed that at early 
common law, bribery extended only to the corruption of 
judges, but by the nineteenth century had “expanded to 
include the corruption of any public official and the bribery of 
voters and witnesses as well.”  Id. at 43 (citing James F. 
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law 85–87 (1877)).  By the 
time Congress passed the Travel Act, fourteen states had 
enacted commercial bribery laws.  Id. at 44.  And it was by 
then commonplace for states to punish bribes paid to or 
received by private individuals in more specific capacities, 
including “agents, common carrier and telegraph company 
employees, labor officials, bank employees, and participants 
in sporting events.”  Id.; see also id. at 44 & n.10 (listing 
examples of state private-sphere bribery provisions). 
 
Even though “bribery” as used in RICO and the Travel 
Act clearly covers bribery of myriad private and public 
persons, see id., Ferriero claims it cannot cover bribery of 
political party officials.  He asserts that at the time of those 
laws’ passage, statutes punishing bribery of party officials 
were not sufficiently widespread to have been incorporated 
into “bribery” for the two federal statutes’ purposes.  He 
relies on Perrin for the proposition that both statutes therefore 
exclude party officials from federal punishment. 
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We disagree.  On our reading of Perrin, the Travel Act 
and RICO incorporate a definition of bribery broad enough to 
encompass bribes paid to or accepted by political party 
officials.  As Perrin pointed out, bribery laws already applied 
to judges, public officials, voters, and witnesses as far back as 
the nineteenth century.  444 U.S. at 43.  If bribery within the 
meaning of the Travel Act (and necessarily RICO) is broad 
enough to likewise include commercial employees, agents, 
labor officials, bank employees, and sporting-event 
participants, id. at 43–44, then the term is also broad enough 
to include political party officials.  Indeed, bribery’s generic 
understanding as explained in Perrin reasonably includes “all 
relations which are recognized in a society as involving 
special trust [that] should be kept secure from the corrupting 
influence of bribery.”  Id. at 45 (quoting Am. Law Inst., 
Model Penal Code § 223.10, pp. 113–17, Comments (Tent. 
Draft No. 11, 1960)).  We understand Perrin’s explanation of 
bribery as extending to party officials who, like numerous 
other private persons and public officials, occupy positions of 
“special trust.”  Id.; see State v. Schenkolewski, 693 A.2d 
1173, 1185 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1997) (explaining that 
New Jersey’s current bribery statute, like its predecessor, is 
intended to “proscribe conduct . . . which ‘denigrates the 
integrity of our public institutions’” (quoting State v. Ferro, 
320 A.2d 177, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974))); Ferro, 
320 A.2d at 181 (describing New Jersey’s predecessor bribery 
scheme as “penaliz[ing] those in an apparent position of trust 
who would utilize their position or relationship to influence 
some governmental activity o[r] public official”).  Therefore, 
we reject Ferriero’s assertion that party officials generally—
and him specifically—fall outside the ambit of either the 
Travel Act or RICO. 
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2. 
Ferriero’s final challenge asserts New Jersey’s bribery 
statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  Ferriero 
raised these arguments before the trial court, and our review 
is plenary.  United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to 
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.”  United 
States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 588 (3d Cir.2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010).  For the criminal 
context in particular, vagueness challenges “may be 
overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons 
would know their conduct puts them at risk of punishment 
under the statute.”  United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 211 
(2012) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration 
omitted); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 20 (2010); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982).  A criminal statute 
therefore “need only give ‘fair warning’ that certain conduct 
is prohibited.”  San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 
1136 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 
104 (1972)). 
 
Ferriero contends the statute’s vagueness arises from 
several terms.  First, he maintains the statute is vague because 
it prohibits accepting “any benefit not authorized by law” as 
consideration for a vote, recommendation, decision, or 
exercise of discretion.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2.  Ferriero 
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also takes issue with the phrase “on a public issue,” id. 
§ 2C:27–2(a), because that phrase remains undefined. 
 
We find no constitutional infirmity in the bribery 
statute’s level of specificity.  By proscribing acceptance of 
“any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion,” id. 
(emphasis added), the statute clarifies that the benefit must be 
given in exchange for a “decision, opinion, recommendation, 
vote or exercise of discretion” in favor of a particular 
outcome.  See Schenkolewski, 693 A.2d at 1185–86 
(describing bribery scheme as paying money “in exchange for 
a ‘promised’ or ‘definitive’ vote” by municipal committee so 
as to “insure favorable action” on local development project); 
see also MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 181 (N.J. 
1996) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting) (explaining the core of the 
bribery statute as special interests paying “a public official to 
control his vote”).  The definition “any benefit not authorized 
by law” narrows the statute further.  For example, New Jersey 
election law provides that county political party committees 
may receive and disburse funds in order to maintain their 
party organization, including for the purposes of hiring staff 
and publicizing candidates and party organizations.  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 19:5–5.  We read New Jersey’s bribery statute as 
sufficiently clear to give party chairs “a reasonable 
opportunity to understand,” Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 588, they 
may not accept payments from vendors in exchange for 
urging party members in local decisionmaking bodies to buy 
those same vendors’ products. 
 
Ferriero also asserts the bribery statute is overbroad.  
“In the First Amendment context, . . . a law may be 
invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its 
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applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”  United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange 
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 
(2008)). 
 
We can find no applications (much less a substantial 
number) of the bribery law that are unconstitutional.  To be 
sure, bribery laws occupy territory ancillary to the First 
Amendment rights to associate and to petition the 
government.  See Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) (“It is well settled that 
partisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 136–37 (1961) (implying that lobbying implicates First 
Amendment petition rights).  But New Jersey’s bribery law 
does not punish legitimate First Amendment activity.  It 
punishes corrupt agreements in which party officials accept 
payment in exchange for making a particular decision or 
recommendation, expressing a particular opinion, or voting a 
particular way.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2 (covering 
benefits exchanged in consideration for “a decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion”).  Such 
corrupt agreements do not enjoy First Amendment protection.  
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers 
to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded 
from First Amendment protections.”).  New Jersey’s bribery 
statute only punishes party officials’ corrupt bargains, not 
their exercise of associational or petition rights.  We do not 
think the application of New Jersey’s bribery statute in this 
case was unconstitutionally vague. 
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C. 
After Ferriero filed his opening brief with this Court, 
the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States, 136 
S.Ct. 2355 (2015), in which the Court interpreted the federal 
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and clarified that provision’s 
definition of the term “official act.”  In a supplemental brief, 
Ferriero contends McDonnell weighs in favor of his statutory 
and constitutional arguments.  On our reading of McDonnell, 
however, we find nothing in that opinion that changes the 
outcome of this case. 
 
McDonnell involved a public-corruption case against 
former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell.  136 S.Ct. at 
2361.  The case stemmed from McDonnell’s relationship with 
Jonnie Williams, a Virginia businessman who sought state 
universities’ help in researching health benefits of a tobacco-
based supplement his company developed.  Id. at 2362. From 
2009 to 2012, McDonnell accepted more than $175,000 from 
Williams in the form of payments, loans, and gifts.  Id. at 
2362–64.  During that same period, McDonnell helped 
Williams in numerous ways, including events McDonnell 
hosted and meetings he arranged with state officials.18  Id. 
                                                 
18 In particular, McDonnell introduced Williams to Dr. 
William Hazel, Virginia’s Secretary of Health and Human 
Resources; he sent Dr. Hazel proposed research protocol for 
studies on Williams’s supplement; and he arranged a meeting 
for Williams with Dr. Hazel’s aide.  Id. at 2362–63.  
McDonnell also hosted a lunch event for Williams’s company 
at the Governor’s Mansion with a guest list that included 
researchers from state universities.  Id. at 2363.  And at a 
meeting with Virginia officials responsible for the state-
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A jury convicted McDonnell of committing honest 
services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion.19  Id. at 2364–65.  
Those charges reflected an underlying theory that Williams’s 
payments in exchange for McDonnell’s actions constituted 
bribery.20  Id. at 2365.  The parties agreed to define terms 
within those charges by reference to the federal bribery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201.  Id.  As a result, both charges 
required the government to prove McDonnell accepted 
Williams’s loans, payments, and gifts in exchange for 
committing, or agreeing to commit, an “official act” within 
the meaning of § 201.  Id.  The government alleged 
                                                                                                             
employee health plan, McDonnell, who took the supplement 
himself, told the officials the pills “‘were working well for 
him’ and ‘would be good for’ state employees.”  Id. at 2364. 
19 The indictment charged McDonnell with conspiracy to 
commit honest services fraud, substantive charges of honest 
services fraud, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, 
substantive Hobbs Act extortion, and making a false 
statement.  Id. at 2365; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349 (honest 
services fraud); id. § 1951(a) (Hobbs Act extortion); id. 
§ 1014 (false statement).  The jury acquitted him of the false 
statement charge.  McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2366. 
20 The Supreme Court has construed the honest services fraud 
statute as prohibiting “fraudulent schemes to deprive another 
of honest services through bribes or kickbacks.”  McDonnell, 
136 S.Ct. at 2365 (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358, 404 (2010)). The Hobbs Act proscribes obtaining the 
property of another “under color of official right,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(b)(2), which includes a “public official . . . ‘taking a 
bribe,’” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992). 
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McDonnell had committed at least five “official acts,” which 
included arranging meetings, hosting events, and 
recommending Williams’s supplement to Virginia state 
officials.  Id. at 2365–66. 
 
The issue in McDonnell arose from the jury 
instructions’ explanation of the term “official act.”  Id. at 
2367.  McDonnell had unsuccessfully requested that the court 
qualify its instruction on “official act” by limiting that term to 
actions and decisions on matters actually pending before the 
state government.21  Id.  The District Court declined to 
include McDonnell’s requested qualification.  Id.  Instead, the 
court followed the government’s proposed instruction, which 
advised the jury that “official act” encompassed “‘acts that a 
public official customarily performs,’ including acts ‘in 
furtherance of longer-term goals’ or ‘in a series of steps to 
exercise influence or achieve an end.’”  Id. at 2366.  Based on 
those instructions, the jury convicted McDonnell, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court vacated McDonnell’s convictions, 
id. at 2375, holding that “[s]etting up a meeting, talking to 
                                                 
21 Specifically, McDonnell had asked the trial court to explain 
that “routine activity,” such as “arranging a meeting” or 
“hosting a reception,” cannot alone amount to an official act, 
because such routine acts “are not decisions on matters 
pending before the government.”  McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 
2366 (quoting United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 513 
(4th Cir. 2015)).  He had also requested the court instruct the 
jury that an official act requires an officeholder intend to 
“influence a specific official decision the government actually 
makes.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
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another official, or organizing an event (or agreeing to do 
so)—without more—does not [constitute] . . . an ‘official 
act,’” id. at 2372.  In doing so, the Court rejected the broad 
definition of “official act” that the government proposed, 
which would encompass “nearly any activity by a public 
official.” Id. at 2367. 
 
The bulk of that holding rested on the Court’s 
interpretation of § 201.  See id. at 2367–72.  Section 201 
defines “official act” as “any decision or action on any 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, 
which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be 
brought before any public official, in such official’s official 
capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.”  18 
U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).  Relying on traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, the Court determined that “a typical meeting, 
call, or event . . . does not qualify as a ‘question’ or ‘matter’ 
under § 201(a)(3).”  McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2369.  More 
concrete governmental decisions could qualify as a pending 
question or matter—namely, state officials’ decisions to study 
the supplement, to allocate grant money for such studies, or to 
cover the supplement in state-employee health insurance 
plans.  Id. at 2370.  But for an “event, meeting, or speech . . . 
related to a pending question or matter” to be an actual 
“decision or action” on that pending question or matter, § 201 
requires “something more”—that is, something like initiating 
an actual study or pressuring another official to commit an 
official act.22  Id. 
                                                 
22 According to the Court, “something more” could be a 
decision or action “to initiate a research study—or . . . [to] 
narrow[] down the list of potential research topics.”  Id. at 
2370.  It would also qualify if a public office “use[d] his 
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The Court reinforced its interpretive conclusion by 
invoking several constitutional concerns that the 
government’s broad definition of “official act” would 
implicate.  First, the government’s definition could chill 
interactions between public officials and their constituents 
that are normal in a democracy.  See id. at 2372.  
“[C]onscientious public officials arrange meetings for 
constituents, contact other public officials on their behalf, and 
include them in events all the time,” id., and too broad a 
definition of “official act” might dissuade constituents from 
making campaign contributions or from conducting normal 
activities like inviting officials “on their annual outing to the 
ballgame,” id.  The Court feared “citizens with legitimate 
concerns might shrink from participating in democratic 
discourse.”  Id. 
 
Second, a definition that encompassed “nearly any 
activity by a public official,” id. at 2367, raised due process 
concerns of vagueness, id. at 2373; see id. (“Under the 
‘standardless sweep’ of the Government’s reading, public 
officials could be subject to prosecution, without fair notice, 
for the most prosaic interactions.” (quoting Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983))).  And finally, 
“significant federalism concerns” weighed against a broad 
interpretation of a federal statute that governed state and local 
officials’ conduct.  Id.; see id. (“[W]e decline to ‘construe the 
                                                                                                             
official position to exert pressure on another official to 
perform an ‘official act’ . . . [or] use[d] his official position to 
provide advice to another official, knowing or intending that 
such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another 
official.”  Id. 
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statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous 
and involves the Federal Government in setting standards’ of 
‘good government for local and state officials.’” (quoting 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987))).  These 
constitutional concerns supported the Court’s decision to 
reject the government’s broad definition in favor of a “more 
constrained interpretation.” Id. 
 
Nothing in McDonnell changes the outcome for 
Ferriero in this case.  Ferriero contends “McDonnell 
reinforces [his] statutory construction arguments.”  Appellant 
Supp. Br. at 5.  He analogizes the phrase “on a public issue,” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2, and “official act,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(a)(3), to seemingly argue that “on a public issue” 
should limit the bribery provision to pending agenda items 
before a town council.  First, McDonnell’s “more 
constrained,” 136 S.Ct. at 2373, construction of “official act” 
was primarily a product of the Court’s interpretive analysis of 
that particular statute and the expansive jury instructions 
given by the District Court.  Although the statutes in 
McDonnell and here both involve bribery, we see no reason 
for transplanting the conclusions in McDonnell that stem 
solely from the Court’s application of general statutory-
construction principles to the particular statute at issue in that 
case. 
 
As for the Court’s admonitions of the “significant 
constitutional concerns,” id. at 2372, raised by the 
government’s position in McDonnell, those concerns do not 
exist here.  New Jersey’s bribery statute is narrower than the 
broad interpretation of “official act” the McDonnell Court 
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rejected.23  That broad interpretation would have 
encompassed “nearly any activity by a public official.”  Id. at 
2367.  New Jersey’s statute requires the paid-for decision, 
opinion, recommendation, vote, or exercise of discretion be 
on a public issue or in a public election.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:27–2(a).  Likewise, we read the New Jersey provision as 
proscribing bribes paid in exchange for party officials 
deciding or voting a certain way, giving a particular opinion 
or recommendation, or exercising discretion in favor of a 
particular outcome.  See Part III.B.1, supra.  We do not think 
New Jersey’s citizens will “shrink from participating in 
democratic discourse,” McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2372, 
because the state’s bribery law prohibits quid-pro-quo 
arrangements in which money is paid “in exchange for a 
‘promised’ or ‘definitive,’” Schenkolewski, 693 A.2d at 
1185–86, decision, opinion, recommendation, or vote. 
 
The other constitutional concerns in McDonnell 
involved vagueness and matters of federalism.  136 S.Ct. at 
2373.  As noted, we do not believe New Jersey’s bribery 
statute is unconstitutionally vague, see Part III.B.2, supra, nor 
does it involve the concerns about vagueness presented by the 
government’s position in McDonnell.  And this case lacks the 
federalism concerns present in McDonnell.  McDonnell 
involved a congressionally written standard that governed the 
conduct of state officials.  Though this case applies a federal 
statute to a nonfederal, local party official, it applies a 
                                                 
23 As noted, that statute prohibits “accept[ing] or agree[ing] to 
accept . . . [a]ny benefit as consideration for a decision, 
opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a 
public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in 
any public election.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27–2. 
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standard from a New Jersey statute written by New Jersey 
legislators.  It simply does not “‘involve[] the Federal 
Government in setting standards’ of ‘good government for 
local and state officials.’”  McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373 
(quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360). 
 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Ferriero’s 
judgments of conviction, forfeiture, and sentence. 
